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Abstract. The online new emerging suspicious users, that usually are
called trolls, are one of the main sources of hate, fake, and deceptive on-
line messages. Some agendas are utilizing these harmful users to spread
incitement tweets, and as a consequence, the audience get deceived. The
challenge in detecting such accounts is that they conceal their identi-
ties which make them disguised in social media, adding more difficulty
to identify them using just their social network information. Therefore,
in this paper, we propose a text-based approach to detect the online
trolls such as those that were discovered during the US 2016 presidential
elections. Our approach is mainly based on textual features which uti-
lize thematic information, and profiling features to identify the accounts
from their way of writing tweets. We deduced the thematic information
in a unsupervised way and we show that coupling them with the textual
features enhanced the performance of the proposed model. In addition,
we find that the proposed profiling features perform the best comparing
to the textual features.
Keywords: Russian Trolls · Twitter · Topic Modeling · Profiling.
1 Introduction
Recent years have seen a large increase in the amount of disinformation and
fake news spread on social media. False information was used to spread fear
and anger among people, which in turn, provoked crimes in some countries. The
US in the recent years experienced many similar cases during the presidential
elections, such as the one commonly known as “Pizzagate” 3. Later on, Twitter
declared that they had detected a suspicious campaign originated in Russia by
an organization named Internet Research Agency (IRA), and targeted the US
to affect the results of the 2016 presidential elections4. The desired goals behind
these accounts are to spread fake and hateful news to further polarize the public
opinion. Such attempts are not limited to Twitter, since Facebook announced in
3 https://www.rollingstone.com/politics/politics-news/anatomy-of-a-fake-news-scandal-125877/
4 https://blog.twitter.com/official/en us/topics/company/2018/
2016-election-update.html
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2 Anonymous et al.
mid-2019 that they detected a similar attempt originating from UAE, Egypt and
Saudi Arabia and targeting other countries such as Qatar, Palestine, Lebanon
and Jordan5. This attempt used Facebook pages, groups, and user accounts
with fake identities to spread fake news supporting their ideological agendas.
The automatic detection of such attempts is very challenging, since the true
identity of these suspicious accounts is hidden by imitating the profiles of real
persons from the targeted audience; in addition, sometimes they publish their
suspicious idea in a vague way through their tweets’ messages.
A previous work [19] showed that such suspicious accounts are not bots in a
strict sense and they argue that they could be considered as “software-assisted
human workers”. According to [9], the online suspicious accounts can be catego-
rized into 3 main types: Robots, Cyborgs, and Human Spammers. We consider
IRA accounts as another new emerging type called trolls, which is similar to
Cyborgs except that the former focuses on targeting communities instead of
individuals6.
In this work, we identify online trolls in Twitter, namely IRA trolls, from
a textual perspective. We study the effect of a set of text-based features and
we propose a machine learning model to detect them7. We aim to answer three
research questions: RQ1. Does the thematic information improve the detection
performance?, RQ2. Can we detect IRA trolls from only a textual perspective?
and RQ3. How IRA campaign utilized the emotions to affect the public opinions?
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In the following section, we
present an overview on the literature work on IRA trolls. In Section 3, we describe
how the used dataset was compiled. Section 4 describes our proposed features for
our approach. The experiments, results, and analyses are presented in Section
5. Finally, we draw some conclusions and discuss possible future work on IRA
trolls.
2 Related Work on IRA Trolls
After the 2016 US elections, Twitter has detected a suspicious attempt by a
large set of accounts to influence the results of the elections. Due to this event,
an emerging research works about the Russian troll accounts started to appear
[7,32,19,13,2].
The research works studied IRA trolls from several perspectives. The work in
[13] studied the links’ domains that were mentioned by IRA trolls and how much
they overlap with other links used in tweets related to ”Brexit”. In addition, they
compare ”Left” and ”Right” ideological trolls in terms of the number of re-tweets
they received, number of followers, etc, and the online propaganda strategies they
used. The authors in [7] analyzed IRA campaign in both Twitter and Facebook,
and they focus on the evolution of IRA paid advertisements on Facebook before
and after the US presidential elections from a thematic perspective.
5 https://newsroom.fb.com/news/2019/08/cib-uae-egypt-saudi-arabia/
6 https://itstillworks.com/difference-between-troll-cyberbully-5054.html
7 Data and model are available at: https://www.github.com/anonymous
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The analysis work on IRA trolls not limited only to the tweets content, but
it also considered the profile description, screen name, application client, geo-
location, timezone, and number of links used per each media domain [32]. There
is a probability that Twitter has missed some IRA accounts that maybe were
less active than the others. Based on this hypothesis, the work in [19] built a
machine learning model based on profile, language distribution, and stop-words
usage features to detect IRA trolls in a newly sampled data from Twitter. Other
works tried to model IRA campaign not only by focusing on the trolls accounts,
but also by examining who interacted with the trolls by sharing their contents [1].
Similarly, the work [2] proposed a model that made use of the political ideologies
of users, bot likelihood, and activity-related account metadata to predict users
who spread the trolls’ contents.
3 Data
To model the identification process of the Russian trolls, we considered a large
dataset of both regular users (legitimate accounts) and IRA troll accounts. Fol-
lowing we describe the dataset. In Table 1 we summarizes its statistics.
Table 1: Description of the dataset.
Russian Trolls Regular Accounts Total
Total # of Accounts 2,023 94,643 96,666
Total # of Tweets 1,840,679 1,945,505 3,786,184
3.1 Russian Trolls (IRA)
We used the IRA dataset8 that was released by Twitter after identifying the
Russian trolls. The original dataset contains 3, 841 accounts, but we use a lower
number of accounts and tweets after filtering them. We focus on accounts that
use English as main language. In fact, our goal is to detect Russian accounts
that mimic a regular US user. Then, we remove from these accounts non-English
tweets, and maintain only tweets that were tweeted originally by them. Our final
IRA accounts list contains 2,023 accounts.
3.2 Regular Accounts
To contrast IRA behaviour, we sampled a large set of accounts to represent the
ordinary behaviour of accounts from US. We collected a random sample of users
that they post at least 5 tweets between 1st of August and 31 of December,
2016 (focusing on the US 2016 debates: first, second, third and vice president
8 https://about.twitter.com/en us/values/elections-integrity.html
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debates and the election day) by querying Twitter API hashtags related to the
elections and its parties (e.g #trump, #clinton, #election, #debate, #vote,
etc.). In addition, we selected the accounts that have location within US and
use English as language of the Twitter interface. We focus on users during the
presidential debates and elections dates because we suppose that the peak of
trolls efforts concentrated during this period.
The final dataset is totally imbalanced (2% for IRA trolls and 98% for the
regular users). This class imbalance situation represent a real scenario. From
Table 1, we can notice that the number of total tweets of the IRA trolls is
similar to the one obtained from the regular users. This is due to the fact that
IRA trolls were posting a lot of tweets before and during the elections in an
attempt to try to make their messages reach the largest possible audience.
4 Textual Representation
In order to identify IRA trolls, we use a rich set of textual features. With this set
of features we aim to model the tweets of the accounts from several perspectives.
4.1 Thematic Information
Previous works [26] have investigated IRA campaign efforts on Facebook, and
they found that IRA pages have posted more than ∼80K posts focused on di-
vision issues in US. Later on, the work in [7] has analyzed Facebook advertised
posts by IRA and they specified the main themes that these advertisements
discussed. Given the results of the previous works, we applied a topic modeling
technique on our dataset to extract its main themes. We aim to detect IRA trolls
by identifying their suspicious ideological changes across a set of themes.
Given our dataset, we applied Latent Dirichlet Allocation (LDA) topic mod-
eling algorithm [5] on the tweets after a prepossessing step where we maintained
only nouns and proper nouns. In addition, we removed special characters (except
HASH ”#” sign for the hashtags) and lowercase the final tweet. To ensure the
quality of the themes, we removed the hashtags we used in the collecting pro-
cess where they may bias the modeling algorithm. We tested multiple number
of themes and we chose seven of them. We manually observed the content of
these themes to label them. The extracted themes are: Police shootings, Islam
and War, Supporting Trump, Black People, Civil Rights, Attacking Hillary, and
Crimes. In some themes, like Supporting Trump and Attacking Hillary, we found
contradicted opinions, in favor and against the main themes, but we chose the
final stance based on the most representative hashtags and words in each of them
(see Figure 1). Also, the themes Police Shooting and Crimes are similar, but we
found that some words such as: police, officers, cops, shooting, gun, shot, etc. are
the most discriminative between these two themes. In addition, we found that
the Crimes theme focuses more on raping crimes against children and women.
Our resulted themes are generally consistent with the ones obtained from the
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Facebook advertised posts in [7], and this emphasizes that IRA efforts organized
in a similar manner in both social media platforms.
Based on our thematic information, we model the users textual features w.r.t.
each of these themes. In other words, we model a set of textual features inde-
pendently for each of the former themes to capture the emotional, stance, and
others changes in the users tweets.
(a)
(b)
Fig. 1: (a) Supporting Trump and (b) Attacking Hillary themes words clouds.
For the theme-based features, we use the following features that we believe
that they change based on the themes:
– Emotions: Since the results of the previous works [7,26] showed that IRA
efforts engineered to seed discord among individuals in US, we use emotions
features to detect their emotional attempts to manipulate the public opinions
(e.g. fear spreading behavior). For that, we use the NRC emotions lexicon
[25] that contains ∼14K words labeled using the eight Plutchik’s emotions.
– Sentiment: We extract the sentiment of the tweets from NRC [25], positive
and negative.
– Bad & Sexual Cues: During the manual analysis of a sample from IRA
tweets, we found that some users use bad slang word to mimic the language
of a US citizen. Thus, we model the presence of such words using a list of
bad and sexual words from [11].
– Stance Cues: Stance detection has been studied in different contexts to
detect the stance of a tweet reply with respect to a main tweet/thread [24].
Using this feature, we aim to detect the stance of the users regarding the
different topics we extracted. To model the stance we use a set of stance
lexicons employed in previous works [3,12]. Concretely, we focus on the fol-
6 Anonymous et al.
lowing categories: belief, denial, doubt, fake, knowledge, negation, question,
and report.
– Bias Cues: We rely on a set of lexicons to capture the bias in text. We model
the presence of the words in one of the following cues categories: assertives
verbs [17], bias [28], factive verbs [21], implicative verbs [20], hedges [18],
report verbs [28]. A previous work has used these bias cues to identify bias
in suspicious news posts in Twitter [31].
– LIWC: We use a set of linguistic categories from the LIWC linguistic dic-
tionary [30]. The used categories are: pronoun, anx, cogmech, insight, cause,
discrep, tentat, certain, inhib, incl9.
– Morality: Cues based on the morality foundation theory [15] where words
labeled in one of a set of categories: care, harm, fairness, cheating, loyalty,
betrayal, authority, subversion, sanctity, and degradation.
Given Vi as the concatenation of the previous features vectors of a tweeti, we
represent each user’s tweets by considering the average and standard deviation
of her tweets’ V1,2,..N in each theme j independently and we concatenate them.
Mathematically, a user x final feature vector is defined as follows:
userx =
T⊙
j=1
∑Nji=1 Vij
Nj

√∑Nj
i=1(Vij − Vj)
Nj
 (1)
where given the jth theme, Nj is the total number of tweets of the user, Vij is
the ith tweet feature vector, Vj is the mean of the tweets’ feature vectors. With
this representation we aim at capturing the ”Flip-Flop” behavior of IRA trolls
among the themes (see Section 5.4).
4.2 Profiling IRA Accounts
As Twitter declared, although the IRA campaign was originated in Russia, it
has been found that IRA trolls concealed their identity by tweeting in English.
Furthermore, for any possibility of unmasking their identity, the majority of IRA
trolls changed their location to other countries and the language of the Twitter
interface they use. Thus, we propose the following features to identify these users
using only their tweets text:
– Native Language Identification (NLI): This feature was inspired by
earlier works on identifying native language of essays writers [22]. We aim to
detect IRA trolls by identifying their way of writing English tweets. As shown
in [31], English tweets generated by non-English speakers have a different
syntactic pattern . Thus, we use state-of-the-art NLI features to detect this
unique pattern [8,23,14]; the feature set consists of bag of stopwords, Part-
of-speech tags (POS), and syntactic dependency relations (DEPREL). We
9 Total pronouns, Anxiety, Cognitive processes, Insight, Causation, Discrepancy, Ten-
tative, Certainty, Inhibition, and Inclusive respectively.
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extract the POS and the DEPREL information using spaCy10, an off-the-
shelf POS tagger11. We clean the tweets from the special characters and
maintained dots, commas, and first-letter capitalization of words. We use
regular expressions to convert a sequence of dots to a single dot, and similarly
for sequence of characters.
– Stylistic: We extract a set of stylistic features following previous works
in the authorship attribution domain [33,4,29], such as: the count of spe-
cial characters, consecutive characters and letters12, URLs, hashtags, users’
mentions. In addition, we extract the uppercase ratio and the tweet length.
Similar to the feature representation of the theme-based features, we represent
each user’s tweets by considering the average and standard deviation of her
tweets’ V1,2,..N , given Vi as the concatenation of the previous two features vectors
of a tweeti. A user x final feature vector is defined as follows:
userx =
∑Ni=1 Vi
N
;
√∑N
i=1(Vi − V )
N
 (2)
where N is her total number of tweets, Vi is the ith tweet feature vector, V
is the mean of her tweets feature vectors.
5 Experiments and Analysis
5.1 Experimental Setup
We report precision, recall and F1 score. Given the substantial class imbalance
in the dataset, we use the macro weighted version of the F1 metric. We tested
several classifiers and Logistic Regression showed the best F1macro value. We
kept the default parameters values. We report results for 5-folds cross-validation.
5.2 Baselines
In order to evaluate our feature set, we use Random Selection, Majority Class,
and bag-of-words baselines. In the bag-of-words baseline, we aggregate all the
tweets of a user into one document. A previous work [6] showed that IRA trolls
were playing a hashtag game which is a popular word game played on Twitter,
where users add a hashtag to their tweets and then answer an implied question
[16]. IRA trolls used this game in a similar way but focusing more on offending or
attacking others; an example from IRA tweets: ”#OffendEveryoneIn4Words un-
documented immigrants are ILLEGALS”. Thus, we use as a baseline Tweet2vec
[10] which is a a character-based Bidirectional Gated Recurrent neural network
10 https://spacy.io/models
11 We tested TweetNLP [27], the state-of-the-art POS tagger on tweets, but spaCy
produced higher overall results.
12 We considered 2 or more consecutive characters, and 3 or more consecutive letters.
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reads tweets and predicts their hashtags. We aim to assess if the tweets hashtags
can help identifying the IRA tweets. The model reads the tweets in a form of
character one-hot encodings and uses them for training with their hashtags as
labels. To train the model, we use our collected dataset which consists of ∼3.7M
tweets13. To represent the tweets in this baseline, we use the decoded embedding
produced by the model and we feed them to the Logistic Regression classifier.
IRA dataset provided by Twitter contains less information about the ac-
counts details, and they limited to: profile description, account creation date,
number of followers and followees, location, and account language. Therefore,
as another baseline we use the number of followers and followees to assess their
identification ability (we will mention them as Network Features in the rest of
the paper).
5.3 Results
Table 2 presents the classification results showing the performance of each feature
set independently. Generally, we can see that the thematic information improves
the performance of the proposed features clearly (RQ1), and with the largest
amount in the Emotions features (see −themes and +themes columns). This result
emphasizes the importance of the thematic information. Also, we see that the
emotions performance increases with the largest amount considering F1macro
value; this motivates us to analyze the emotions in IRA tweets (see the following
section).
The result of the NLI feature in the table is interesting; we are able to detect
IRA trolls from their writing style with a F1macro value of 0.91. Considering
the results in Table 2, we can notice that we are able to detect the IRA trolls
effectively using only textual features (RQ2).
Finally, the baselines results show us that the Network features do not per-
form well. A previous work [32] showed that IRA trolls tend to follow a lot of
users, and nudging other users to follow them (e.g. by writing ”follow me” in
their profile description) to fuse their identity (account information) with the
regular users. Finally, similar to the Network features, the Tweet2vec baseline
performs poorly. This indicates that, although IRA trolls used the hashtag game
extensively in their tweets, the Tweet2vec baseline is not able to identify them.
5.4 Analysis
Given that the Emotions features boosted the F1macro with the highest value
comparing to the other theme-based features, in Figure 2 we analyze IRA trolls
from emotional perspective to answer RQ3. The analysis shows that the themes
that were used to attack immigrants (Black People and Islam and War) have
the fear emotion in their top two emotions. While on the other hand, a theme
like Supporting Trump has a less amount of fear emotion, and the joy emotion
among the top emotions.
13 We used the default parameters that were provided with the system code.
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Table 2: Classification results. We report the results of each feature set indepen-
dently.
Method Precisionmacro Recallmacro F1macro
Random Selection 0.5 0.5 0.35
Majority Class 0.49 0.5 0.5
Tweet2vec 0.49 0.5 0.5
Network Features 0.49 0.5 0.5
Theme-based Features -themes +themes
Emotions 0.59 0.5 0.5 0.87
Sentiment 0.49 0.5 0.5 0.64
Bad & Sexual Cues 0.49 0.5 0.5 0.79
Stance cues 0.91 0.53 0.56 0.86
Bias Cues 0.73 0.51 0.51 0.87
LIWC 0.69 0.51 0.51 0.85
Morality 0.90 0.62 0.68 0.86
Profiling Features
Stylistic 0.92 0.84 0.88
NLI 0.96 0.88 0.91
All Features 0.96 0.93 0.94
Fig. 2: Emotional analyzing of IRA trolls from thematic perspective.
Why do the thematic information help? The Flip-Flop behavior. As an example,
let’s considering the fear and joy emotions in Figure 2. We can notice that
all the themes that used to nudge the division issues have a decreasing dashed
10 Anonymous et al.
line, where others such as Supporting Trump theme has an extremely increasing
dashed line. Therefore, we manually analyzed the tweets of some IRA accounts
and we found this observation clear, as an example from user x:
Islam and War : (A) @RickMad: Questions are a joke, a Muslim asks
how SHE will be protected from Islamaphobia! Gmaffb! How will WE
be protected from terrori. . .
Supporting Trump: (B) @realDonaldTrump: That was really exciting.
Made all of my points. MAKE AMERICA GREAT AGAIN!
Figure 3 shows the flipping behaviour for user x by extracting the mean value
of the fear and joy emotions. The smaller difference between the fear and joy
emotions in the Islam and War theme for this user is due to the ironic way of
tweeting for the user (e.g. the beginning of tweet A: ”Questions are a joke”).
Even though, the fear emotion is still superior to the joy. We notice a similar
pattern in some of the regular users, although much more evident among IRA
trolls.
Fig. 3: Flipping emotions between themes by user x (an IRA troll).
To understand more the NLI features performance, given their high perfor-
mance comparing to the other features, we extract the top important tokens for
each of the NLI feature subsets (see Figure 4). Some of the obtained results
confirmed what was found previously. For instance, the authors in [31] found
that Russians write English tweets with more prepositions comparing to native
speakers of other languages (e.g. as, about, because in (c) Stop-words and RP14
in (a) POS in Figure 4). Further research must be conducted to investigate in
depth the rest of the results.
Linguistic Analysis. We measure statistically significant differences in the cues
markers of Morality, LIWC, Bias and Subjectivity, Stance, and Bad and Sexual
14 RP stands for ”adverb, particle” in the POS tag set.
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(a) POS (b) DEPREL (c) Stop-words
Fig. 4: The top 10 important tokens in each of the NLI features.
words across IRA trolls and regular users. These findings presented in Table 3
allows for a deeper understanding of IRA trolls.
False Positive Cases. The proposed features showed to be effective in the clas-
sification process. We are interested in understanding the causes of misclassifying
some of IRA trolls. Therefore, we manually investigated the false positive tweets
and we found that there are three main reasons: 1) Some trolls were tweeting
in a questioning way by asking about general issues; we examined their tweets
but we did not find a clear ideological orientation or a suspicious behaviour in
their tweets. 2) Some accounts were sharing traditional social media posts (e.g.
”http://t.co/GGpZMvnEAj cat vs trashcan”); the majority of the false positive
IRA trolls are categorized under this reason. In addition, these posts were given
a false theme name; the tweet in the previous example assigned to Attacking
Hillary theme. 3) Lack of content. Some of the misclassified trolls mention only
external links without a clear textual content. This kind of trolls needs a second
step to investigate the content of the external links. Thus, we tried to read the
content of these links but we found that the majority of them referred to deleted
tweets. Probably this kind of accounts was used to ”raise the voice” of other
trolls, as well as, we argue that the three kinds of IRA trolls were used for ”likes
boosting”.
12 Anonymous et al.
Table 3: Linguistic analysis of Morality, LIWC, Bias and Subjectivity, Stance,
and Bad and Sexual cues shown as the percentage of averaged value of
tweets with one or more cues across IRA trolls (X) and regular users (Y) in a
shape of X(arrows)Y. We report only significant differences: p-value ≤ 0.001↑↑↑,
≤ 0.01↑↑, ≤ 0.05↑ estimated using the Mann-Whitney U test. The tweets average
value is the mean value across the themes.
Morality LIWC Bias language
category Pvalue category Pvalue category Pvalue
care 1.39↑↑↑0.74 pronoun 53.34↑47.59 assertive 6.53↓↓↓7.05
harm 2.39↑↑↑1.61 anx 1.91↑↑↑0.98 bias ×
fairness 0.64↓↓↓0.84 cogmech × factive 5.58↑↑↑3.95
cheating 0.06↓↓0.31 insight 12.16↑↑↑10.08 hedge 10.06↑↑↑9.69
loyalty 0.84↓↓↓1.26 cause 10.76↑↑↑10.27 implicative 9.09↑↑↑6.37
betrayal 0.13↓↓↓0.35 discrep 12.73↑↑↑11.07 report 14.37↓↓↓18.89
authority 1.59↓↓↓1.88 tentat 13.95↑↑↑12.29 strong subj 54.15↑↑↑49.9
subversion 0.38↑↑↑0.33 certain 13.59↑↑↑10.69 weak subj 50.33↑41.96
Sanctity 0.44↑↑↑0.27 inhib 4.19↑↑↑3.87 - -
degradation 0.54↑↑↑0.49 incl 20.69↓↓21.24 - -
Stance Bad and Sexual
category Pvalue category Pvalue
belief 2.97↑↑↑2.49 bad 5.45↑↑↑4.66
denial 0.63↑↑↑0.57 sexual 3.54↑↑↑3.16
doubt 1.34↑↑↑1.25 - -
fake 0.49↓↓↓1.22 - -
knowledge 0.75↓↓↓1.48 - -
negation 11.46↑↑↑9.10 - -
question 3.12↑↑↑2.44 - -
report 2.86↓↓↓3.46 - -
6 Conclusion
In this work, we present a textual approach to detect social media trolls, namely
IRA accounts. Due to the anonymity characteristic that social media provide to
users, these kinds of suspicious behavioural accounts have started to appear. We
built a new machine learning model based on theme-based and profiling features
that in cross-validation evaluation achieved a F1macro value of 0.94. We applied
a topic modeling algorithm to go behind the superficial textual information of
the tweets. Our experiments showed that the extracted themes boosted the per-
formance of the proposed model when coupled with other surface text features.
In addition, we proposed NLI features to identify IRA trolls from their writing
style, which showed to be very effective. Finally, for a better understanding we
analyzed the IRA accounts from emotional and linguistic perspectives.
Through the manually checking of IRA accounts, we noticed that frequently
irony was employed. As a future work, it would be interesting to identify these
accounts by integrating an irony detection module.
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